Murphy: [intejecting] I underst- I understand- you dis- you dispute my premise. I- I- I will stipulate- I will stiuplate to that, okay. I think that, I- I think that that's a fallacy to suggest that no one is going to step forward and replace Guaido, and I think we have to sort of at least think through the criteria by which we may recognize somebody else. Let me ask a quick second question, which is this: Guaido's prerequisites for participating in the election did not include Maduro stepping down, and yet you've said as recently as a week ago that the only thing we want to talk to Maduro about is his removal from power. Um, are we open - the United States of America - uh to a discussion with Maduro in which he stays in power, um as a transition to an election that is actually free and fair? Because frankly, even if he's not in power there's no guarantee that that his allies couldn't rig an election. So why aren't we open to that as a possible path forward?

Abrams: Because we do not believe that a free election in Venezuela is possible with Maduro in power, in control of the army, in control of the police, in control of the colectivo gangs, with two or three thousand Cuban intelligence agents. We do not see that that is a possibility of a free election.

Murphy: I- I would say Guaido doesn't share that view, because his preconditions for taking part in the elections did not, um, require the removal of Maduro. And it is also not clear that even without Maduro there could be a free and fair uh, election. And so I- I- I think this is just a prescription to get stuck uh in a downward spiral of American policy from which we cannot remove ourselves. We've got to be more nimble, more creative, more open to solutions by which we could get to an election, uh even with Maduro there as a trans- as a transition. Um, thank you Mr. Chairman.

Abrams: If I could- can I respond for just a few seconds? [Chairman: Go ahead.] You know, we presented this a framework for a democratic transition precisely to show what we would like to see happen. And the in the framework, both sides the Chavistas and the opposition, in the National Assembly, elect a transitional government. Each side has veto power. Guaido and Maduro would not participate in the transitional election. Both could run for president in a future free presidential election. We thought we were putting out - and many, many countries who've looked at this, have said, this is a- this is a positive formula - and we showed the way to the lifting of U.S. sanctions. And I would just say again, just under 60 countries support Guaido. So the notion that we have done this alone and without international support, Senator, I would submit, is not accurate.

Murphy: ... We undermined Norway's talks last summer and then this March we released a transition framework that frankly is almost a carbon copy of the very one that was in front of the parties last year. And now, after wasting all of this time, we are stuck with elections about to happen. That, as we've talked about today, Guaido and the opposition refuse to enter. And then we are going to be in a position where we are recognizing someone as the leader of Venezuela who doesn't control the government, who doesn't run the military, and who doesn't even hold office. And we don't do this in other places, right? We - nobody knows the name of the guy who finished second in the 2018 Russian presidential election. We don't recognize that person as the president of Russia, no matter how corrupt those elections are. Because doing that makes us look weak and feckless if we can't actually do anything about it. And so, I do think it's important to, to ask some questions about what comes next. And I might have time for only one, but I have two. The first is this question of what do we do with Guaido? So, you're saying we're going to recognize him because he is the former leader of the National Assembly, but you know there are, Mr. Abrams, are contests for supremacy within the opposition. What happens if six months from today someone else emerges as a more legitimate voice for the opposition than Juan Guaido? What criteria do we use to recognize someone new, or is Juan Guaido going to be the recognized leader of Venezuela, permanently, no matter how conditions change on the ground?

Elliott Abrams: I think the situation with Guaido is unique because he is the president of the National Assembly. They're going to have a corrupt election now which no one, I think - no democratic country - is going to recognize. And that corrupt election, that fraud, is not going to change Guaido's status. And I don't think you'll find anybody in the in the opposition leadership who will claim otherwise. Also, I'd just like to say, senator, you know I- that was not the vote of confidence in the policy I would have liked- ...

Chairman: Senator Murphy.

Chris Murphy: Uh, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Uh, you know, I feel like it's Groundhog Day in this committee, we've been told by the administration, frankly multiple administrations for years, that Russia's support for Assad and Iran's sport support for Assad is tepid, it's fragile, it's just a matter of time before he falls. The truth of the matter is they were always willing to do more than we were in Syria to protect their interests, and that is likely the exact same case here in Venezuela, and so our policy has been misguided by fundamentally flawed assumptions from the beginning. Um, and I have deep respect for both of you, who are testifying before this committee, but we just have to be clear that our Venezuela policy over the last year and a half has been an unmitigated disaster, and if we aren't honest about that, then we can't self-correct. We have to admit that our big play - recognizing Guaido right out of the gate and then moving quickly to implement sanctions - just didn't work. It didn't. All it did was harden Russia and Cuba's play in Venezuela and allow Maduro to paint Guaido as an American patsy and a lot of us warned that this might happen. Um, we could have used the prospect of U.S. recognition or sanctions as leverage. We could have spent more time trying to get European allies and other partners on the same page. We could have spent more time trying to talk to or neutralize China and Russia early before we back them into a corner, a corner from which they are not moving. They are not moving. But all we did was play all our cards on day one, and it didn't work. And it's just been an embarrassing mistake after mistake since. First we thought that getting Guaido to declare himself president would be enough to topple the regime. Then we thought putting aid on the border would be enough. Then we tried to sort of construct a kind of coup in April of last year and it blew up in our face when all the generals that were supposed to break with Maduro decided to stick with him in the end. ...